Argentina is approaching a revolutionary confrontation. Two and a half years of the Milei government have produced a systematic destruction of working class living conditions, the fascistic transformation of the state apparatus, and the direct subordination of the country to the interests of US imperialism. The Labor Modernization Law pushed through in February authorizes twelve-hour workdays, eliminates industry-wide contracts and slashes severance pay. It is a massive assault on labor rights won over more than a century of struggle.

The closure of the FATE tire factory with 920 layoffs, the chronic police repression of pensioners at their weekly protests outside Congress, the authorization of US troops to enter Argentine naval bases and the $20 billion IMF bailout coordinated last September by Trump’s Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent are all paving the way to an escalating social explosion. This is a regime, as the WSWS wrote in March, consciously designed “to take the country back 100 years.”

Against this backdrop, May Day 2026 was a politically charged event, watched closely by the Argentine bourgeoisie, the major press and sections of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. For the first time since the formation of the pseudo-left Left and Workers’ Front–Unity (FIT-U) in 2011, its four component parties held two separate rallies on the international workers’ holiday. While the Partido Obrero (PO), Movimiento Socialista de los Trabajadores (MST), and Izquierda Socialista (IS) held a joint rally at Buenos Aires’ Plaza de Mayo, the Socialist Workers Party (Partido de los Trabajadores Socialistas, PTS)—the largest party of FIT-U and the leading section of the Morenoite Permanent Revolution Current (PRC-FI)—drew a more substantial crowd of over 5,000 to a separate rally five miles away, at the Ferro indoor stadium.

Bregman’s speech and the PTS’s answers to the crisis in Argentina

The Morenoites’ rally was addressed by leading PTS members, representatives from the PRC sections in France, Brazil and Chile, and union activists from FATE and from companies such as Mondelez, Lustramax and Georgalos. The main speaker was Deputy Myriam Bregman, whose speech closed the event.

La Izquierda Diario, the PTS’s website, boastfully reported:

The event also had significant media coverage on television channels, radio stations and newspapers, coming at the end of a week in which the “Myriam Bregman phenomenon” had dominated the national discussion in Argentina. The growing media attention comes from polls showing Bregman as the political leader with the most positive image in the country.

The fundamental aim of the Ferro rally, the PTS announced, was launching the campaign for a “new workers’ party” in Argentina. Bregman defined its political content in her speech:

Has the time not come to put on its feet a new historical movement? A new historical movement that organizes from below? A movement of workers? A party of the working class? That is why our proposal is to discuss how to organize, how to put on its feet, a movement for a party of the new working class—that working class that is ever more exploited, ever more oppressed, feminized, persecuted, discriminated against. And we have the strength of the Left Front to start from. We also have a program to start discussing: the program of the Left Front—a program of class independence.

The program of the party to be built is, in Bregman’s own formulation, “the program of the Left Front”—not the program of the Fourth International, not the program of Trotskyism, not based upon any programmatic document with a defined socialist content.

Further exposing the Morenoites’ political project, Bregman declared:

We do not hide that we want to transform this society at its roots. Ending capitalism is the way to end genocides—that is why we set ourselves the goal of building our own political instrument […] a great party of the new working class.

This formulation captures precisely the opportunist content of the PTS’s proposal. The defense of socialism—the declaration that “we do not hide” wanting to “end capitalism”—is presented as a matter of the personal opinion of the PTS leadership. It is not, however, the program of the party they propose to build. The projected “political instrument” is a reformist labor party, oriented to a Peronist trade union bureaucracy in crisis, based upon “the program of the FIT-U”—a generically “class-independent” platform with no defined socialist content. The defense of socialism is incorporated as a tendency’s right within a reformist labor party, justified by the need to “unite forces” and “organize the sympathy” registered in the polls.

The PTS’s proposal stands firmly in the rotten political tradition of Pabloism, of which Morenoism is a variant: the adaptation of forces claiming to be revolutionary to the bourgeois apparatuses tasked with containing the workers’ movement, mediated by the rhetoric of unity and tactical pretexts such as the “isolation” of revolutionaries. The operation does not require the PTS leadership to stop rhetorically affirming their opposition to capitalism. On the contrary, it requires that they continue to do so—because it is precisely that cover which allows the broad, programmatically reformist party to trap radicalized workers and youth, diverting them from the historic task of building a revolutionary Marxist leadership.

The demand for a “new workers’ party” was combined in Bregman’s speech with a seemingly radical call for “Coordinating bodies, neighborhood assemblies, popular assemblies—whatever it takes so that the unions, so that the student centers, can once again become tools of struggle.”

The explicit function of these bodies is to make “the unions once again become tools of struggle.” The orientation is not to the formation of independent organs of workers’ power—soviets, autonomous factory committees, dual-power structures in the sense elaborated by revolutionary Marxism out of the experiences of the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917. It is the formation of intermediary bodies designed to pressure the existing bureaucratic leaderships of the CGT and reclaim them as instruments of struggle. The rotten and bureaucratized Peronist union apparatus is not to be abolished; it is ostensibly to be pushed to the left and compelled to engage in self-reform.

The Morenoites’ obsession with polling numbers and Bregman’s approval rating was the dominant theme at the rally’s podium. PTS leader Christian Castillo opened his address by citing the Atlas Intel survey that places Bregman first in terms of positive approval ratings (47 percent positive to 46 percent negative, with every other major political figure underwater and Milei facing a 62 percent negative rating). Bregman closed her speech by remarking that “people are starting to say it—presidenta.”

While the PTS built its intervention around its polling numbers as sectors of bourgeois public opinion, the media and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia size up the party as a potential administrative option for the next phase of the crisis, it turns its back on the masses of workers and youth masses who are alienated from the entirety of Argentina’s institutional politics. These masses, who will surge to the fore in the revolutionary upheavals that are on the agenda, are outside of the PTS’s strategic horizon.

The concept of the “new working class” advanced by the PTS deserves direct examination. Describing the working class as “feminized, persecuted, discriminated against” is not a Marxist interpretation of class society. It is the vocabulary of identity politics, oriented toward the concerns of the upper middle class—as are the rally’s self-characterizations as “feminist” and “ecological.” More fundamentally, it is entirely oblivious to the most decisive transformation in the working class over recent decades: its massive international expansion and integration through the globalization of production.

The working class is now a globally integrated class, bound together by supply chains, logistics networks, and financial flows of unprecedented magnitude, whose struggles are objectively international in character and whose power can only be organized on an international basis. The Morenoites’ rejection of the international working class is expressed in their program: for a nationalist party, oriented to the Argentinian trade unions and the country’s bourgeois electoral conjuncture, whose “internationalism” consists of holiday greetings exchanged between affiliated parties operating within and subordinated to their respective national frameworks.

Bregman closed her speech with a call for a “a real rebellion, a general strike, to put an end to the situation faced by millions”—rhetorically framed as a Cordobazo del siglo XXI. The invocation of the Cordobazo in this context erases the central lesson of this 1969 workers’ and student uprising that rocked Argentina. It objectively posed the question of political power. It was defeated by the absence of a conscious Marxist leadership—the very political vacuum that the Morenoite tendency, one of whose direct continuations the PTS represents, helped create and maintain. The Cordobazo is invoked as an inspiring metaphor by the very political tendency whose intervention helped pave the road from the revolutionary potential of 1969 to the counterrevolutionary catastrophe of 1976.

The fracture in the FIT-U

The FIT-U came out of this May Day fractured. For the first time since its formation in 2011, the four parties composing the front held separate rallies.

The Left and Workers’ Front–Unity brings together four parties—the PO, MST, IS and PTS. The PTS, MST and IS all formed through successive splits from the Morenoite trunk; the PO emerged from a separate and purely national lineage. Constituted in 2011, it holds parliamentary seats at the federal and provincial levels. As the World Socialist Web Site has documented over the years, the political function of the FIT-U has been to provide cover to the CGT bureaucracy, channel radicalized workers back into Peronism and prevent the emergence of an independent political leadership of the working class.

In mid-April, the PTS announced that it would hold a separate May Day rally, justifying its decision on two grounds in an open letter to the FIT-U. First, it denounced the other parties in the Front for engaging in initiatives that dilute “the demarcation from Peronism and the union bureaucracy, opening the prospect of an ‘anti-Milei front’ with no class demarcation whatsoever from the treacherous union leadership.”

Second, it positioned the Ferro rally as part of “a series of international activities of its current”—a reference to PRC rallies in Paris and in São Paulo during 2025. The PTS thus sought to present itself as more consistently “internationalist” and firmer in its class demarcation than its front partners.

In the joint May Day rally of the other FIT-U parties, the most substantive address fell to MST leader Alejandro Bodart, general secretary of the International Socialist League (ISL). As if speaking at the threshold of forming a government, he framed the political situation in Argentina in the following terms:

Milei is in trouble, worse than he’s ever been. […] The other pillar of the Argentine bourgeois regime is also in trouble—the Justicialist Party. […] For the first time in history, the Left is on everyone’s lips. […]

We know that there are comrades who, faced with this new situation, are asking themselves: Can we govern? Do we have the strength to do so?

Look, comrades, not only can we govern, but we must lead the left to pull the country out of this crisis.

Both in Bodart’s May Day speech and in an April 22 open letter to the PTS leadership, the MST accused Bregman’s party of squandering what it sees as an “historical opportunity” for the left due to a supposedly sectarian attitude and vacillation over taking power.

By “sectarianism,” the MST is referring to the PTS’s refusal to share the “strong electoral support and positive public image, as reflected in various polls and opinion surveys,” which “Comrade Myriam Bregman is the one who best manages to capitalize on.”

By their accusation that the PTS recoils from the prospect of the FIT-U “coming into office,” the MST has in mind not a government formed through the overthrow of the Argentine bourgeois state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the participation of the FIT-U as a left-wing variant in a governmental formula within the bourgeois-democratic regime, along the lines of Syriza in Greece in 2015 and Podemos in Spain between 2020 and 2023.

The Partido Obrero, addressing the Plaza de Mayo rally through Gabriel Solano, joined the MST and Izquierda Socialista in attacking the PTS for splitting the rally. Before the event, Solano denounced as “a shame” the PTS’s decision to convene a “divisionist event,” insisting Bregman’s party still had time to reverse what he called its “self-referential” position. From the platform, he closed the rally with a call for the FIT-U to convene a National Assembly open to all the fighters of the country as the alternative path forward.

The PO occupies a particular position within the FIT-U. Originating as a split from the 1960s MIR-Praxis (Política Obrera), a group oriented to Guevarist guerrilla action, it established several opportunist alliances with international groups that had broken with the Fourth International. These included during the 1970s the international current led by Pierre Lambert, another Pabloite who broke with the International Committee of the Fourth International in 1971 and would later briefly ally with Moreno.

The PO has the most substantial work in the trade unions of any of the four parties: through Romina del Plá in the teachers’ union, the SUTNA tire workers led by Alejandro Crespo, and the Polo Obrero among the unemployed and workers in the informal sector. It competes with the PTS over which formation presents itself as a better guardian of class delimitation. Where the PTS calls for a new workers’ party modeled on the early Brazilian PT and the MST proposes a single FIT-U party with the right of tendencies, the PO advances the convocation of a National Assembly open to “all fighters” to “transform Argentina” in the broadest terms.

Solano laid out the underlying analysis in his May 8 editorial in Prensa Obrera, “The Strategy of Power of the Left”: the polls reveal a gap between Bregman’s positive image and the FIT-U’s lower voter intention, exposing the task of “generating loyalty” among popular sectors. Workers, in the PO’s reading, are turning toward revolutionary positions; the conjuncture, however, is not yet ripe. Consequently, what is required is adapting to the spontaneous radicalization of workers as a path of least resistance, without breaking illusions in the union bureaucracy or Peronism.

The dueling polemics among the four parties—over who is more sectarian, who adapts more to Peronism, who electorally capitalizes on Bregman’s popularity—do not represent differences of principle. Bodart himself made this plain when, at Plaza de Mayo, he declared the MST “open to any way out” that would let the front debate how to seize the “historical opportunity”—the workers’ party proposed by the PTS, the single party with tendencies proposed by the MST, or the National Assembly proposed by the PO are, for him, interchangeable options. What unites the three formulas is the underlying diagnosis: the situation is not yet ripe, the working class is being drawn leftward but is not yet ready, the task is to administer the present conjuncture rather than to organize the seizure of power.

This is precisely the diagnosis Trotsky answered in “Once Again, Whither France?” in 1935, against the Stalinist refrain that “the situation is not revolutionary.” His reply was categorical: “The situation is revolutionary, as revolutionary as it can be, granted the non-revolutionary policies of the working-class parties.” The function of the centrist perspective—then and now—is to convert the alleged unripeness of the conjuncture into the justification for adapting to the very forces blocking the revolution: the union bureaucracy, Peronism and the bourgeois electoral process.

The political and social character of the “Bregman phenomenon”

To understand what the PTS is actually doing, it is necessary to understand why it is being watched by the Argentine bourgeoisie. The FIT-U polls at around 9 to 10 percent of the vote. Bregman has emerged as the political figure with the highest approval rating in the country. She appears regularly on bourgeois television channels; the PTS leadership circulates through major press interviews; sections of the Argentine ruling class are actively sizing up the party as a potential administrative option for the next phase of the crisis.

The “Bregman phenomenon” is not primarily a popular working class phenomenon, but a political-media phenomenon produced by the specific conjuncture: the crisis of the Milei government and the demoralization of Peronism have created a vacuum that sections of the bourgeoisie are attempting to fill, promoting a “left-wing” instrument for containing the radicalization of the masses. The PTS’s polling numbers, parliamentary presence, orientation toward bourgeois opinion and proposal for a broad new party with a non-socialist program express the political function the party is preparing to fulfill.

That function has been documented by the WSWS over the entire period of the Milei government. As we wrote in March 2026, the FIT-U has operated in a “sordid division of labor between Peronism, the Peronist-led union bureaucracy and the pseudo-leftist FIT-U in suppressing the class struggle and enforcing [Milei’s] attacks against the working class.” At FATE—the most concrete current example—the Partido Obrero’s SUTNA union, which the PTS hails as a “beacon” for Argentine workers, has oscillated between theatrical appeals for factory occupation and petitions to Peronist Governor Axel Kicillof to nationalize the plant under state administration: pressure on the capitalist state, not independent working class mobilization. The rhetorical militancy of the FIT-U and the practical integration into the bourgeois political apparatus are not contradictory—they are two sides of the same political coin.

This is the contradiction the Marxist concept of centrism captures with precision. Centrism adopts the phraseology of socialist revolution while its concrete political practice serves to contain the revolution’s development. It is distinct from avowed reformism, which openly defends class collaboration, and from right-wing opportunism, which abandons all reference to socialism. Centrism is more dangerous because, draped in revolutionary banners, it occupies the political space where genuine revolutionary leadership should emerge and blocks its development.

The PTS’s political function and the lessons of Morenoism

The function the PTS is preparing to fulfill as the central component of the PRC-FI was defined in advance by the Socialist Equality Group in Brazil in its March 2026 statement, “Morenoites rebrand as ‘Permanent Revolution Current’: A conspiracy against Trotskyism and the coming socialist revolution.” The rebranding of the former Trotskyist Fraction—decided at the Morenoite conference in São Paulo in December 2025—aims to bury the PTS’s continuity with the history of Morenoism and its betrayals, rehabilitate the forces that betrayed the working class in the past, and prepare new betrayals.

In the Argentine crisis, the PTS’s particular function is to rescue the demoralized apparatuses—the Peronist union bureaucracy and the bourgeois political regime—by supplying them with “left-wing” cover capable of absorbing and diverting the revolutionary radicalization of the working class.

The consequences of political operations of this kind, at moments of open revolutionary crisis, are inscribed in blood in the history of Latin America. Chile under the Popular Unity in 1973 and Argentina under the Perón government and the Videla junta between 1973 and 1976 concretely demonstrate what the blocking of revolutionary leadership produces when the working class confronts the objective conditions of socialist revolution.

In Salvador Allende’s socialist-Stalinist “Popular Unity” coalition, elected in 1970 in the midst of a revolutionary upsurge, carried out the program of the “Chilean road to socialism”: partial nationalizations combined with the intransigent defense of the bourgeois state and the Chilean Armed Forces as “the granite foundation of the revolutionary process.” When workers began forming cordones industriales and autonomous organs of power in response to the employers’ conspiracy of October 1972, the government applied the Arms Control Law to disarm them and appointed General Augusto Pinochet commander-in-chief of the Army. The result was the coup of September 11, 1973, tens of thousands of workers and youth detained, tortured and murdered, and two decades of fascist dictatorship.

The decisive factor in that defeat was the absence of a revolutionary Marxist party capable of orienting the Chilean working class in breaking from Stalinism and social democracy and in the struggle for the seizure of power. That absence was bound up with the Pabloite revisionist attack on the Fourth International. The Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), Chilean section of the Fourth International, broke with the International Committee in 1963 under Pabloite leadership and subsequently dissolved itself, merging in 1965 with Castroite and Maoist forces to form the centrist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). The MIR offered “critical support” to Allende and channeled workers and peasants breaking from Stalinism and social democracy into an orientation of “pressuring” the Popular Unity government rather than organizing the fight for workers’ power. It was the Pabloite dissolution of the Trotskyist party and its replacement by the centrism of the MIR that prevented the Chilean working class from overcoming its treacherous leaderships and opened the road to the defeat of 1973.

In Argentina during the same years, the Morenoite operation played an analogous role. The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), formed in 1965 by the fusion of the Morenoite group with Mario Santucho’s Frente Revolucionario Indoamericanista Popular, split in 1968 on the eve of the Cordobazo: Nahuel Moreno progressively integrated himself into the bourgeois Peronist apparatus, while Santucho adopted the methods of guerrillaism.

In 1973, under the Perón government—as the death squads of the Triple A were carrying out a systematic wave of assassinations against the left—the Morenoites declared: “Our party is the only one in the Argentine revolutionary left that has publicly proclaimed its support for the ‘institutionalization process.’” Following Jorge Rafael Videla’s March 1976 military coup, the Morenoites maintained that the Videla regime was “neither objectively nor subjectively” counterrevolutionary. What followed was the physical destruction of the Argentine workers’ vanguard: 30,000 murdered or disappeared.

The PTS consciously seeks to bury this history. But its present-day politics are wholly rooted in it. The central proposal of the Ferro rally—the “gran partido de la nueva clase trabajadora” — is the contemporary rerun of an operation that Morenoism first carried out in the 1980s.

In 1982, amid the dictatorship’s crisis, Nahuel Moreno reconstituted his organization as the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, Movement to Socialism), explicitly conceived as an instrument for channeling the radicalization being prepared by the democratic transition negotiated between the military and US imperialism. Moreno’s pamphlet 1982: The Revolution Begins attributed the defeat of 1976 not to the betrayals of Peronism and Morenoism but to the “reactionary and ultracapitalist political consciousness” of the Argentine worker. The MAS ran Luis Zamora—a middle-class lawyer with no track record in the workers’ movement—as its presidential candidate in 1983, an operation that symbolized its petty-bourgeois perspective.

The MAS explicitly raised, in the same period, the proposal for building a broad “workers’ party.” Its 1985 program stated:

It is possible that the next example of the powerful development of the Workers’ Party of Brazil may prompt some union leaders to repeat that experience in our country. It is well known that the major union leaders linked to social democracy or the Church promoted the development of the PT, calculating that it would block the channeling of the workers’ vanguard toward communism or the Trotskyists. For our part, we also call upon those who think along those lines to found a Workers’ Party, setting sectarianism aside.

The demand for building a workers’ party—originally formulated by Trotsky in 1938 as a tactic for the independent political mobilization of the working class in the United States—was converted by the MAS into one “emptied of its revolutionary content and placed in the service of the agents of the bourgeoisie in the workers’ movement,” as the ICFI wrote in its 1987 statement “No to Stalinism and the Popular Front! Build the Fourth International!” The Brazilian PT was invoked as the model—a party built by union leaders linked to social democracy and the Church precisely to block the channeling of the vanguard toward the Trotskyists, as the MAS itself acknowledged.

The “gran partido de la nueva clase trabajadora” defended by Bregman at the Estadio Ferro on May 1, 2026, brings the same operation into the present situation. Bregman was not politically active when Moreno first carried it out in the 1980s, but the type of political leadership she represents is the direct continuation of the Zamora model: a media figure, a lawyer, attractive to urban petty-bourgeois sectors, completely outside the Trotskyist theoretical and programmatic tradition.

The PTS itself emerged from the MAS, founded in 1988 after its tendency was expelled from the party. Far from constituting a break with the Morenoite tradition, the new party was founded on MAS’s history while taking issue with its post-Moreno leadership. The PTS’s internal structures, formed in their majority by MAS cadres and their political descendants, reproduce this orientation as a natural political practice. The path Bregman is proposing at this moment of deepening revolutionary crisis is the same one whose practical application led to the catastrophe of September 11, 1973, in Chile and to the coup of March 24, 1976, in Argentina itself.

The May Day rally of the ICFI and the way for the working class in Argentina

The political task facing the Argentine working class cannot be carried out within the framework of the FIT-U, nor on the basis of the politics of the PTS, whose objective function is that of a centrist obstacle to the development of revolutionary leadership. It cannot be carried out by the PO, IS and MST, whose political convergence with the PTS on the orientation of integration into the Argentine political system was confirmed on May Day. It cannot be carried out by the CGT bureaucracy or its dissident wings, committed to containing the class struggle; nor by any Peronist dissident tendencies, committed to continuing Peronism’s historical function as mediator between Argentine national capital and US imperialism.

The task is the construction, in Argentina, of a section of the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), the international revolutionary party of the proletariat and the authentic programmatic continuity of Trotskyism. This requires a conscious programmatic break with the entire Morenoite and pseudo-left tradition and the assimilation of the ICFI’s historical struggles against Pabloism, Stalinism and all variants of opportunism. It requires the political formation of Marxist cadres in the midst of the very eruption of the class struggle that is being prepared.

The ICFI’s May Day rally held this same year gave substance to this task. Unlike the “internationalism” of the Ferro rally—an accumulation of greetings to struggles in different countries without programmatic articulation—the ICFI rally brought together 18 interventions from 14 countries across five continents, with captioned transmission in 11 languages, articulating from a single international strategic orientation the political tasks facing the working class on each continent. The ICFI is today the only political tendency in the world that approaches the world crisis as the eruption of the historical and insoluble contradictions of the capitalist system, and that identifies the international working class as the revolutionary force capable of resolving it. The authentic language of Marxism is spoken nowhere else.

In the opening address, David North, chairman of the WSWS International Editorial Board, situated the US-Israeli war against Iran launched on February 28, 2026, as “the culmination of a distinct historical period of 35 years that began with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991”—not as a “discrete episode” or the “policy of a particular president,” but as a qualitatively new stage of capitalist barbarism. “World war,” he stated, “is not a future threat but a reality currently unfolding.” The war against the working class in every country—the dismantling of social rights, the upward redistribution of wealth, the turn of the ruling elites toward authoritarian rule and fascist methods—is an inseparable component of the same trajectory.

The rally identified 2026 as a fundamental turning point in modern history. “The period of relative social equilibrium has ended,” North declared. “The first months of 2026 mark the point at which working class resistance has emerged as a global force, on a scale that places directly on the historical agenda the fundamental questions of the epoch—war or peace, dictatorship or democracy, socialism or barbarism.”

The decisive question of the epoch, North stated, is socialism or barbarism, which of these two tendencies will prevail. Its concrete answer is the conscious construction of the revolutionary political leadership of the international working class. The qualitatively decisive element of the ICFI’s intervention is the ICFI itself—the world party of socialist revolution, with its national sections, the Socialist Equality Parties and Groups, as Trotskyist parties guided by a common international strategy. North closed his opening address:

The question now posed is not whether we must fight, but how to fight and under what banner. Our answer to these questions is this: The way forward is the conscious and organized struggle of the international working class for power. The banner is that of the Fourth International. We say: Build sections of the International Committee of the Fourth International in every country. Take up the fight for socialism. Forward to the world socialist revolution!

The International Workers Alliance of Rank-and-File Committees (IWA-RFC) operates as the instrument for mobilizing the international working class independently of the national union bureaucracies, building rank-and-file committees in factories, logistics platforms, schools and universities across countries. Both the world party and the Alliance give political expression to what Morenoism is structurally incapable of conceiving: the objective existence of a globally integrated working class whose interests are in direct conflict with the form of capitalist domination organized around the nation-state and national union bureaucracies. Morenoite “internationalism” remains trapped within the Argentine national framework because its political structure and strategic horizon are entirely determined by the electoral conjuncture of the Argentine nation-state.

The WSWS calls on Argentine workers and youth who follow the political crisis in their country with seriousness, and who feel drawn by the apparently combative positions of the PTS and the FIT-U, to rigorously study the history of the International Committee of the Fourth International and the program of revolutionary Trotskyism. The political legacy of Pabloism and Morenoism—Chile 1973, Argentina 1976, MAS 1982—is not a past to be rhetorically evoked; it is the objective test of what such traditions produce at moments of revolutionary crisis. The repetition of that pattern is not destiny, but it is the inevitable consequence of the continuity of Morenoite political leadership. The alternative is the conscious construction of an international revolutionary leadership in Argentina as an immediate political task, amid the explosion of the class struggle.